How to Vote in Minnesota

At a Glance

• Voter registration requires proof of identity and proof of residence, as well as affirmation of eligibility to vote (e.g. U.S. citizen, MN resident at least 20 days) under penalty of law. All voter registration applications are reviewed by election officials to confirm eligibility to vote.
• Minnesota is exempt from the use of provisional ballots as required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 since we have had election day registration since 1974.
• A 2018 audit conducted on voter registration by the Independent Office of the Legislative Auditor did not find significant numbers of ineligible voters nor recommend any additional restrictions to voter access.

Registering to Vote in Minnesota

Voters may register using a paper form, an online voter registration form on the Secretary of State’s website, or when applying for a new or updated driver’s license. An individual will be registered to vote if they are eligible to vote under MN statute when they properly complete and submit an application through the Department of Vehicle Services (DVS), with proof of United States citizenship. Voters will be sent a card to allow them to opt-out of registering to vote.

When someone registers to vote through any process, they have to show two basic things: that they are who they say they are, and they live where they say they live. If an individual does not have an approved ID or Social Security number, local election officials must “reasonably conclude” the person is eligible to vote using available information to verify their name and DOB. When registering to vote, applicants are also required to affirm, under penalty of law that they are:

• A U.S. citizen
• At least 18 years old on Election Day (16 & 17 year olds can pre-register)
• A resident of Minnesota for 20 days
• Not currently incarcerated for a felony conviction
• Not under a court order that revokes their right to vote

When a voter registration application is received, county election officials review public records to ensure that a voter is validly registered to vote, look into challenges, and address any discrepancies in voter registrations. Register to vote online or check your registration here.

Since 2023, 16 and 17 year olds have been able to pre-register to vote. This expanded the existing allowance for 17 year olds to register if they would be 18 years old at the next election. Those who are under 18 and pre-register to vote are not added to the list of eligible registered voters in SVRS until they are 18 and their eligibility is verified by election officials.

Those who register to vote on the day they vote using election day registration are allowed to vote based on the review of eligibility at the polling place by election judges. Local election officials confirm the individual’s eligibility to register and vote after election day.

A 2018 audit conducted on voter registration by the independent Office of the Legislative Auditor did not find significant numbers of ineligible voters, nor recommend any additional restrictions to voter access. See below for the report and results.

Minnesota is exempt from the use of provisional ballots as required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 since we have had election day registration since 1974. Learn more about why this is specifically not required by law.

SAFEGUARD: Proof of identification and residence is required at this stage in the process. For a full list of acceptable identifications to register to vote visit this page on the Minnesota Secretary of State’s website.

Additional Reading

Voter Registration Evaluation Report (2018): The audit concludes: “County attorneys’ reports over an almost two-year period indicated 69 instances of registration or voting by ineligible persons.” (Because 2.9 million people voted in the 2016 election, this results in an error rate of less than 0.003%.)

MIT’s State Election Landscapes: MIT’s State Election Landscapes provides a comprehensive overview of how elections are conducted in the six Great Lakes States: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Read through the report or explore topics of interest along the left.

At a Glance

• When a person comes to vote on election day, they must confirm they are who they say they are and live where they say they live with an election judge.
• Ballot integrity is ensured via a daily 3-step bipartisan matching of the number of ballots issued with the number indicated on the ballot tabulator and the number of registered voters checked in.
• From when a ballot is received at the county/city election office or precinct until it is certified by the county and state, pairs of election officials handle the ballots.

The Counting of Ballots

Overview: The first check when a person comes to vote on election day is that they must ‘check-in’ with an election judge. They must state their name and address to confirm they are who they say they are and they live where they say they live. If the election judge finds them on the voter roll, but there is an “AB” next to the voter’s name, they will be unable to vote in person, as the “AB” indicates they have already voted absentee / by mail.

If a person is not on the list of registered voters when they check in on election day, they can register and vote using election-day registration. In order to do this, again they must prove their identity and residence (acceptable ways to do so are found here on this list). Once they are registered, they can vote. Their vote will be counted based on the evidence provided to election judges. A final verification of the individual’s registration is performed by county election officials after election day.

SAFEGUARD: Once voting has ended (either on an early voting day or on election day), the first thing election judges do at the close of polls is to confirm that the number of voters who checked in matches the number of ballots given to voters and the number of ballots the tabulator says it scanned. There are generally at least four election judges working at each one of these steps on election day. All of the numbers at each step must match up before election results are reported.

Another important piece of election security is the actual ballot box – where the ballots are kept once they are cast. The ballot box is part of the equipment which scans and counts the ballots and is always monitored by an election judge. The number of ballots deposited into the ballot box is periodically monitored and recorded, to make sure it matches the number of people who received ballots, and the number of ballots cast and counted. Election judges working at the end of the election day sign a summary statement that includes a variety of statistics reflecting what happened in their polling place. These statistics include how many voters checked in, how many voted paper ballots were cast, the number of ballots cast as reflected on the tabulator, and how many election judges served throughout the day.

At a Glance

• Absentee ballots require ID verification, a witness, and the voter’s signature. If a voter’s ballot is accepted, it is entered into the Statewide Voter Registration System to ensure they cannot vote again on election day.
• Drop boxes are maintained by the county auditor or municipal clerk, not the USPS.
• All ballots are opened and processed in pairs of absentee ballot board members.

Absentee Voting

Overview: Absentee balloting has been used for over a century in Minnesota – it actually dates all the way back to the Civil War. Due to its long tenure in Minnesota, many safeguards have been put in place to ensure that all mail-in / absentee voting is secure.

Verification: Any time a Minnesotan completes an absentee ballot application, they must include their name, birthday, and either their Minnesota driver's license number, or Minnesota state identification card number, and the last four digits of the applicant's Social Security number. If an applicant does not possess both types of documents, the applicant must include the number for one type of document and must affirmatively certify that the applicant does not possess the other type of documentation. These pieces of information help the election workers confirm their voter registration is valid before their vote is counted.

VIDEO: Go behind the scenes of absentee ballot processing →

SAFEGUARDS: The individualized and unique barcode attached to the voter and their ballot also ensures that each voter is sent the correct ballot materials. This process also notes that the voter has submitted an absentee ballot application, and has been sent an absentee ballot. This prevents the voter from being able to vote by absentee as well as in-person. Once completed and returned to the county elections office, every absentee ballot application gets entered into the Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS). The voter’s application and absentee ballot signature envelope are then tied to that voter with a unique barcode. This allows the ballot to be tracked in the SVRS and is why voters are able to track their ballots on the MN Secretary of State’s site. The individualized and unique barcode is also used to track the status of each ballot, in particular whether it has been replaced and whether it has been accepted for counting. This prevents the voter from being able to vote both an original ballot and a replacement or by absentee as well as in-person.

Mail-in Only Precincts:

• In Minnesota, these are only comprised of precincts selected by the local governing body that are townships, unorganized portions of counties, precincts with fewer than 100 registered voters, or cities that have fewer than 400 registered voters.
• Each registered voter in these areas automatically gets mailed a ballot. Unlike an absentee ballot, a mail ballot is sent only to the voter’s residence (not to any other mailing address) and is sent by non-forwardable mail. A voter who has not registered in advance or who wants to receive their ballot at a temporary location needs to apply for an absentee ballot, just as in any other precinct. Each voter can only vote one way or the other: all the signature envelopes are tracked using unique barcodes, whether they are for mail ballots or absentee ballots.
• The absentee ballots that voters in mail-in only districts contain the same safeguards as other absentee ballots (unique barcodes, signature envelope information, etc.)

If you want to learn more about the process of voting by mail, you can read our blog post, How Your Mail-in Ballot Protects Your Privacy or read the section below for Opening and Processing Ballots. You can also check out our facts sheet on voting by mail, and any of the extensive and broad-ranging references used in it here.

Opening and Processing Absentee Ballots

Overview: The group of people who receive, process, and validate absentee ballots is called the absentee ballot board. Members of the ballot board consist of election judges and non partisan deputy county auditors and deputy city clerks who have been trained in the processing and counting of absentee ballots. Election judges are required to identify a party affiliation, because two election judges of the same party cannot work together. This is one of the safeguards in the system. Moreover, a couple of particularly sensitive tasks can only be done by these bipartisan teams of election judges, not by the deputies. Only election judges can compare signatures and supervise the duplication of non-scannable ballots.

There are two parts of the processing of absentee ballots. The first is receiving and verifying the validity of the absentee ballot to determine whether it meets the criteria to be accepted or must be rejected. This is done soon after receipt so that if the ballot is rejected due to a paperwork problem, the voter has an opportunity to try again.

The ballot board accepts a signature envelope if it is signed by the voter, has been properly witnessed, and has identifying information that matches what is on file for the barcode. The identifying information that is checked is the name, address, and either a driver’s license or state ID number or the last four digits of the social security number. If the identifying number isn’t available or doesn’t match, then election judges on the ballot board compare the signature on the envelope with the one from the application form. All of these checks are in addition to verifying that the voter only votes once and that if they don’t have an up-to-date registration, they submitted the proper registration materials.

After the information on the signature envelope has been verified by the ballot board, the ballots go into a secured location until they can be opened and counted. This second phase of processing must start no earlier than the close of business 19 days before the election. The first step in counting an absentee ballot, after the signature envelope information has been verified, is to remove the ballot secrecy envelope from the signature envelope. The ballot secrecy envelopes are segregated from the signature envelopes, and the signature envelopes are kept. This step ensures that each ballot is secret.

Then, the ballots are removed from the ballot secrecy envelope. As the ballots are removed, the pairs of ballot board workers verify that each envelope contains only exactly one voted ballot and that it is for the proper precinct. If a ballot is for the wrong precinct or is not in good enough condition to be scanned, then it must be copied over onto a fresh ballot. The duplicate and the original are numbered to allow the work to be tracked and the original is separately retained.

SAFEGUARDS: If a ballot needs to be duplicated to address a technical error that does not make it impossible to determine the voter’s intent, a team of election judges from different parties are required to duplicate the ballot following the established laws and guidelines for these types of situations. After an absentee ballot is received and accepted, it is noted in the SVRS. So if a voter goes to vote in person after voting early by absentee, the election judge would see that they had voted already by absentee and the voter would be turned away. They do not even reach the stage of getting a ballot. Conversely, for any absentee ballot processed on Election Day, the ballot board doesn’t open the envelope until after verifying that the voter hasn’t voted at the polling place.

At a Glance

• Public accuracy tests are conducted on all ballot machines / tabulators, which are purchased locally.
• A bipartisan post-election audit is conducted to certify the election, which is open to the public, and includes a final report for all counties.
• After the audit, all ballots are kept in protected storage for 22 months.
• A formal complaint and public recount process already exists to address the very negligible errors that can occur.

Ballot Machines

Overview: In addition to the established and secure paper trail that is part of the election process in Minnesota, there are also safeguards on the ballot tabulation machines. These safeguards include the design and approval of the machines, testing of election equipment before they are used, and standards for conduct of elections. The Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State (OSS) uses the Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS), which uses similar security measures to a bank, and has the voting tabulators tested by a federal agency before being certified by the state.

As part of testing election equipment before it is used counties run what are called “test decks” to verify equipment performance after which they conduct a certain minimum number of public tests of the tabulating machines to demonstrate they perform as required. By law on election day ballot recording and tabulating systems cannot be connected to any electronic network or to the internet. Only after a record of the election results has been printed by election judges can the head election judge electronically transmit the elections results. The results are transmitted using a special encrypted connection to upload the data to the county elections website. After a state general election, counties must conduct a public "post-election review (or audit)" for randomly-selected precincts to double check that the tabulators worked properly. The precincts to be audited are selected by the county canvassing board by lot, and the ballots are hand-counted by a party-balanced group of election judges of the votes cast for President or governor; United States Senator; and United States Representative.

Voting Machine Selection and Testing Voting machines are selected by each individual county from a list of equipment approved by the Secretary of State’s office. Before a voting machine is approved for use, it must first meet certain criteria and be certified by the Secretary of State’s office. This means that a machine used in an election gets rigorously tested before it is even purchased for use.

Part of the extensive testing that voting machines must go through prior to an election is accurately reading what are called “test decks.” These are a set of sheets / practice ballots. The people testing the machine have a spreadsheet of what the answers will look like when they come out of the tabulator. If the machine tabulates the correct numbers, then it is secured until election day. The testers must certify that they tested the machine with the appropriate test decks, and that the machine accurately read the decks.

Additionally, each county must conduct a certain minimum number of public tests of the tabulating machines. Anybody from the public is allowed to be present at the testing, and the final results are all published online. Again, the testers must certify and sign that they have done the testing, and that it was accurate before they seal and secure the machine again until election day. This ensures that election equipment is tested multiple times prior to every election to ensure that it is functioning properly. In between elections, these machines are completely shut down and secured, and completely inaccessible to any outside tampering.

Ballot recording and tabulating systems are not connected to the internet during voting, and so cannot be remotely hacked. They also cannot be physically hacked as the memory chips are locked into the machine, and only the head election judge or county clerk have the key for them, and/or can deputize another person to hold the key.

Along with the hardware being secure, and the software unable to be hacked, each memory chip from each tabulator is encrypted with the machine number on it. This means that when the information is pulled from the machines, it is impossible to duplicate the result from any of the machines – the data from one machine is only able to be pulled once. It would also indicate if data from any machine in the precinct is missing.

The only time during the process when the data is connected to any electronic network or the internet in any way is when it is being uploaded to the county elections or OSS website. In order to keep the data secure, a special encrypted connection is used. The election results from the tabulating system are printed before the results are electronically transmitted to county elections.

After all recounts, and the post-election audit is done, then the election materials are moved into permanent storage by pairs of two people. The area where the ballots are stored again has limited access including two people present at all times, sign-in requirements, and video surveillance. The election material is then kept for 22 months after the election.

Post-Election Audit Process

Election results are not official until they have been reviewed and certified by a canvassing board. The canvassing board checks to make sure the numbers received from the county and the election judges at the precincts match. If the numbers don’t match, the canvassing board must figure out where the discrepancy came from before they can certify the results.

Canvassing boards are also involved in the process of randomly selecting precincts for review after every statewide general election. They can also oversee a recount, but their main purpose is to certify that the numbers received from the election judges at the precincts and county election officials are a match. This makes the election results official pending legal challenges.

After the information is canvassed, the county moves to the post election review. This process is open to the public.

• A random selection of precincts are drawn after every statewide general election, and the party-balanced election judges hand-count the ballots from the selected precincts to make sure they match up with the tabulating machine data.
• Officials involved are again working in pairs at all times.

In addition to the automatic post-election review process, candidates can request a recount of their race.

• If it is within a certain threshold, it is publicly funded.
• If not, candidates can request a discretionary recount.
• The recount process is also open to the public, and is conducted by the election officials in pairs at all times.

Additional Election Security Measures

• Biggest security system is the decentralization of the election system – there is no “central” / federal system that can be hacked / tampered with. There are federal standards, but each state sets their own laws and standards.
• Even the seals used to seal up election results information and voting machines are tracked via serial number to ensure no one tampers with them.
• Election officials must verify that voting machines are printing out zeros at the start of the day and the ballot boxes are empty.
• Paper trails are key in Minnesota and are used at practically every step in the process to check and re-check results.
• Testing of vote tabulator machines is public.
• We do have challengers (not poll watchers / poll observers) on election day and during the absentee vote certification process, but challengers must have personal knowledge that the person they are challenging is not eligible to vote.
• We have a process for people to file complaints if they believe something went wrong or if they saw something against our election laws happening at a polling place. Complaints get turned over to their county attorney.
• Transparency is a main focus of the Minnesota elections system.

Independent Election Observation

LWVMN in partnership with Citizens for Election Integrity MN (CEIMN) observed the 2022 post-election review in eleven counties and expressed confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the PER. Our partnership began in 2006 to provide independent non-partisan observation of election results, to insure that we have verifiable, transparent, and accurate elections.

Resources

• The Minnesota Voting Rights Act (also available in Spanish), adopted in 2024, sets a new standard for protecting voters of color by enshrining protections against voter suppression into state law, among other things. Learn more about your rights to vote safely and without intimidation or misinformation from the Office of Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison.
• From Verified Voting, “While hand counts are necessary for checking election outcomes in audits and recounts, widespread expansion of hand counting would impair election administration and undermine public confidence in U.S. elections.” Their recent report documents the realities and risks to election night hand counts.
• The academic paper titled, “Needles in Haystacks: Noncitizen Voting Violations in Minnesota”, by University of St Thomas Law Professor Virgil Wiebe debunks the fears of noncitizens voting in Minnesota.
• Ken Peterson, a Clean Elections Minnesota board member, comments how “Minnesota is making democracy work better by improving voting laws: A review of the state’s procedures, including what’s new this year” in the Minnesota Star Tribune. Peterson highlights how Minnesota consistently ranks high in voter turnout and explains the changes in our voting laws.
• Clean Elections MN has a detailed webpage on how we know our Elections are Safe and Secure with testimonials from election judge neighbors who ensure election security.
• Poll Watchers and Challengers, from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL): “Partisan poll watchers and challengers play a role in election transparency throughout the nation…They are prohibited from interfering in the electoral process apart from reporting issues to polling place authorities and party officials.” A Poll Challenger in Minnesota must “have personal knowledge that the voter isn't eligible to vote there” and can be an election judge, eligible voter from the same precinct where the voter is being challenged, or an appointed challenger. Nonpartisan candidates and/or major political parties (MN DFL & MN GOP) can appoint one challenger per precinct.
• LWVMN Article, before the 2022 election, correcting election misinformation at the legislature with the facts (originally published in the Minnesota Reformer).

2020 Elections Were Accurate - Proven Facts from Across the Political Spectrum

• Nationally, in the six states where former President Trump challenged the 2020 election results, there were 475 potential instances of fraud out of 25 million votes cast, making 2020 widely acknowledged as secure by both parties and the courts.
• The Brennan Center for Justice does an excellent job of listing government officials, judges and elected leaders, overwhelmingly Republican, who have publicly acknowledged confidence in the November 2020 Election.
• This report, titled “Lost, Not Stolen” was issued by "political conservatives who have spent most of our adult lives working to support the Constitution and the conservative principles upon which it is based: limited government, liberty, equality of opportunity, freedom of religion, a strong national defense, and the rule of law"
• This exhaustive fact check by PBS New Hour is also filled with evidence from across the political spectrum and shows that the 2020 elections were not "stolen"
• A Wisconsin judge ruled in 2022 that a Republican-ordered, taxpayer-funded investigation into the 2020 election found “absolutely no evidence of election fraud" - AP News Article
• Another AP News article from 2022 presents the overwhelming evidence that there were no major problems with drop boxes during the 2020 election.
• Within Minnesota specifically, please refer to the thorough audit done on MN Voter Registration by the Office of the Legislative Auditor, an evaluation requested and approved by the Legislative Audit Commission (LAC), which has equal representation from both the Minnesota House and Senate, and the two major political parties.
• Reporting done by the Minnesota Star Tribune documents the problems of election misinformation occurring here in our State, and how the League of Women Voters is working to combat it - Read the Story